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FOREWORD
The American Indian occupies a unique position in American society and
law. Although United States citizens, reservation Indians are not subject to the
Federal Constitution or to the taxes and regulatory controls of the states in
which they live and vote. Although many tribes have formulated their own
constitutions and established their own courts, reservation governments are
not recognized as fully sovereign entities. And although reservation Indians
are characterized at times as wards of the federal government, no consistent
standard of responsibility has been established to define and delimit the plenary power of Congress over the entire range of Indian affairs. As the contributors to this symposium indicate, the unique position of the American Indian is deeply affected by the, social, economic, and historical context in which
the relations between Indians and white America have developed.
At present Indians are among the poorest members of American society.
A few statistics help to portray the bare outlines of their situation. Of the
763,000 people who identified themselves as Indians in the 1970 census,' 38
per cent had incomes below the poverty line. In the poorest areas of Arizona
and Utah this figure reached upwards of 65 per cent, while employment for
reservation men, which averaged 18 per cent nationwide, climbed well above
the 30 per cent mark in many areas. Death from tuberculosis, dysentery, and
accidents occurs four times more frequently among Indians than among the
rest of the population. And although educational levels have been rising, the
average number of years of schooling for Indians is still from one to three
years less than for whites.
The social and economic problems of the Indian do not result only from
the greed and duplicity of those who invaded the continent and forced or

1. The census data cited here is derived from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION: AMERICAN INDIANS, at PC(2)-IF (1972). The overall

population figure does not include the 34,000 Eskimo and Aleut peoples. Since the census survey
does not include figures for over half of the more than 280 Indian reservations, the statistics
cited here should not be regarded as comprehensive. For a general compilation of Indian survey
data see S. LEVITAN & W. JOHNSTON,
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(1975). The data on Indian health are drawn from U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, INDIAN HEALTH TRENDS AND SERVICES (1974).
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cajoled its original inhabitants to occupy ever more marginal lands. These
problems also result from a long history of inconsistent laws and regulations,
ill-conceived policies and contradictory reforms. Initially, federal policy recognized the limited autonomy of Indian tribes while actively encouraging
them to adopt white technology and culture. Thomas Jefferson believed that
the Indian was uniquely adaptable, and that with the aid of advanced technology, he would create the basis for an indigenous American yeomanry.2
Whatever its theoretical merits, Jefferson's conception was undermined by a
series of social and economic forces. The sudden introduction of modern
technology among the tribes created pressures that struck at the bases of Indian social organization: their own society was being destroyed at the same
time that the Indians were given no distinct place in American society at
large.
In the period from 1830 to 1870, American policy was nominally directed
toward the protection of tribal communities, but actually consisted of removing most tribes from the eastern half of the nation and isolating them in
enclaves where missionaries and government officers could pursue their goal
of "civilizing" the Indian. The establishment of reservations neither abated
pioneer intrusion nor government aversion to the existence of separate entities within the body politic. The General Allotment Act of 1887 aimed at
breaking up the communal land base of tribal existence by individualizing
property holdings. By 1928, when it was evident that allotment had failed as a
vehicle for assimilation and economic development, a new federal policy was
adopted. Through the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the New Deal administration sought to support tribal organization and collective landholding
by restricting the alienation of individual allotments, permitting tribes to organize their own governments, and increasing the level of federal support
programs. Subsequent programs were directed toward the termination of the
special status of tribal communities and the relocation of individual Indians
away from their reservations, but these programs have in turn been denounced and partly rescinded by subsequent administrations.
In short, as Wilcomb Washburn points out, Indian legal history has been
characterized by a series of ad hoc policies arising from momentary exigencies
and grounded in no clearly articulated set of general principles. American
Indian policy thus gives the appearance of a series of geologic strata, each
successive layer being supported by but not completely effacing those of an
earlier time. The allotment policy may have been overlaid by the Indian
Reorganization Act, but allotments that were already formed have continued
to exist, subject to federal trust supervision. Tribes whose federal services
were terminated have remained subject to the effects of the discredited Ter2.
(1974).
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mination Policy even as they seek to be reinstated to their former position.
Neither Congress nor the courts have thus far succeeded in reducing the ambiguities and inconsistencies of Indian legal status.
It is, however, well within the power of Congress to alter the legal position
of Indian tribes. Courts have consistently recognized that the power granted
Congress under the Constitution is extensive in the field of Indian affairs,
and wholesale legislative reform has been a preferred instrument for altering
federal Indian policy. Recognizing the confused state of current programs
and statutes, Congress has established the Indian Policy Review Commission
and authorized it to formulate recommendations for possible legislative action. As Congressman Lloyd Meeds, Vice-Chairman of the Commission,
points out, the investigations conducted by the Commission's numerous task
forces should help to clarify the implications that would stem from the
enactment of any federal Indian policies.
Any reconsideration of Indian policy will, of course, have to take into account the contending interests of the basic triad of powers involved in Indian
affairs-the federal, state, and tribal governments. New policies must also
consider those-judicial doctrines on which the participants have come to rely;
the conflicting interests of white farmers, ranchers, and environmentalists;
and the aims of private corporations and public utilities seeking to utilize reservation resources. No less important is the choice of rationales used by
courts to interpret the scope of federal power. The limitations on the power
of the federal government vary as the source of that power is seen to rest on
the initial right of discovery or conquest, the nature and terms of individual
treaties, or the constitutional grant of control over trade and intercourse with
the Indian tribes. If the precise range of federal, state, and tribal powers is
not clearly articulated for all situations, new legislative programs affecting
American Indians will only be as good as their judicial interpretations.
In exploring some of the critical areas of concern in Indian law, the contributors to this symposium focus on several major issues: the exercise of
jurisdiction, the control of water and mineral resources, compensation for lost
properties, taxation, and education. Several additional issues on which task
forces of the Indian Policy Review Commission have worked must also be
mentioned: the status of non-reservation and non-treaty tribes, the applicability of the Federal Constitution to tribal proceedings, and the reconsideration
of Indian treaties.
Few political groupings in the United States have felt the implications of
Mr. Justice Holmes's assertion that 'jurisdiction is power" more forcefully
than the American Indians. Although tribes had long been denominated
"domestic dependent nations" and "semi-sovereign entities," Congress and the
courts have been reluctant to recognize too broad a scope of jurisdiction in
the councils and tribunals of the reservation groupings. State governments,
moreover, asserted that where the federal government failed to act, state
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courts were free to move into the legal vacuum. However, in 1958, the Supreme Court, in Williams v. Lee, argued that states could exercise jurisdiction
over those matters the federal government had left untended only if the
state's action did not infringe on the right of the tribes "to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."' 3 Although the Court initially narrowed its own
doctrine by arguing that Congress's power was absolute only where Congress
had acted to retain exclusive control, 4 the later holding in Warren Trading Post
Company v. Arizona Tax Commission5 reasserted that the field of Indian law was
preempted by the federal government as against the states, especially where
state control of reservation activities would interfere with federal policies intended to benefit the Indians. These two doctrines-the federal preemption
and the furtherance of Indian self-government-have not, however, been
fully or consistently explored. The uncertainties about what is meant by tribal
sovereignty and the precise bounds of federal, state, and tribal power are
most evident in the areas of jurisdiction and resource control.
It is axiomatic that sovereignty implies the power to interpret and enforce
the laws made by one's own form of government. The federal government
has recognized this power in the Indian tribes as often as it has sought to
regulate it. The Indian Reorganization Act afforded tribes the opportunity to
adopt constitutions and establish their own governmental machinery. But as
Russell Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson indicate, the primary concern in federal approval of tribal governments has always been the maintenance, through tribal police and courts, of those cultural precepts and organizational controls that have served the goals of the dominant force. Indeed, as
Steve Nickeson's analysis of the Bureau of Indian Affairs demonstrates, the
political in-fighting of the federal agency most directly charged with administering federal Indian policy is incomprehensible without an understanding of
how the organization of that agency is largely divorced from the interests of
those it affects. Given the underlying bureaucratic structure of the agency,
Nickeson suggests, the administration of any Indian policy may stray far from
its stated goals and procedures.
Although many tribes adopted constitutions-which received the requisite
approval of the Secretary of Interior most readily when they followed the
form suggested by the Bureau of Indian Affairs-issues such as jurisdictional
scope have remained open-ended. Increasingly various state and federal
courts have recognized that tribes may not only exercise jurisdiction over civil
matters such as contracts, 6 torts,7 and child custody, 8 but also may enforce
3.

358 U.S. 217, 220 (1958).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
380 U.S. 685 (1965).
See Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 404 F. Supp. 1338 (D.S.D. 1975).
See Schwartz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
See Fisher v. District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., Civil No. 75-5366 (U.S.
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their own statutes against non-Indians who are present on the reservation. 9
Even where a similar statute might not be upheld if applied by state or federal authorities outside a reservation, courts have recognized that such laws
might have a legitimate scope and meaning within the context of tribal
culture.' 0 Indeed, the laws of an Indian tribe have, in some instances, been
granted full faith and credit in state court in accordance with the same principles applied to the judgments of territories and states." Such a trend is,
however, based on judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes and the courts'
own sense of their underlying rationales, rather than on clear legislative precepts that could be given more consistent and uniform application.
To many non-Indians the fact that Indian tribunals might apply different
procedures and criteria of liability than white courts-and might even apply
these alien standards to non-Indians within their domain-is antithetical to
both their sense of justice and their belief in the universal applicability of the
standards prescribed by the Federal Constitution. In fact, the Constitution
does not apply to reservation Indians."2 Recognizing that Indians, as American citizens, should be entitled to certain guarantees similar to those embodied in the Constitution, Congress did, however, enact the Indian Civil
Rights Act in 1968.13 This Act repeats many of the provisions of the Federal
Bill of Rights and applies them to the proceedings of Indian tribal governments and courts, although it does not make the Federal Constitution and all
of its judicial interpretations directly applicable to the tribes.1 4 To many Indians the Act is an assault on tribal sovereignty, for it allows an action to be
brought in federal court for matters that, in the eyes of its detractors, are
solely the concern of the Indians. In fact, the courts have tended to apply full
constitutional safeguards to Indian procedures only where the Indians themselves have adopted electoral rules or judicial forms that are identical to those
used in state or federal situations.' 5 Where a sufficiently high interest exists in
Sup. Ct., Mar. 1, 1976), in 3 INDIAN L. REP. a-6 (1976); Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333,
347 A.2d 228 (1975).
9. See Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975); Long v. Quinault Tribe,
3
Civil No. C75-67T (W.D. Wash., Sept. 2, 1975), in 3 INDIAN L. REP. g-1 (1976); Belgarde v.
Morton, Civil No. C74-6835 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 18, 1975).
10. See Big Eagle v. Andera, 508 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1975). But see State of Nevada v. Jones,
Civil No. 8416 (Nev. Sup. Ct., Feb. 20, 1976), in 3 INDIAN L. REP. h-27 (1976).
11. See Jim v. C.I.T. Financial Services Corp., 533 P.2d 751, 87 N.M. 362 (1975).
12. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir.
1974); Tom v. Sutton, Civil No. 75-1551 (9th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976), in 3 INDIAN L. REP. e-21
(1976).
13. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, §§ 201-03, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03
(1970)).
14. See Jacobson v. Forest County Potawatomi Community, 389 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis.
1974); Tom v. Sutton, Civil No. 75-1551 (9th Cir., Mar. 10, 1976).
15. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Driving Hawk, Civil No. 76-1077 (8th Cir., Mar. 5, 1976), in 3
INDIAN L. REP. d-I (1976); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1436 (1976); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
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furthering Indian culture, the courts have not deemed the case proper for
the application of strict constitutional requirements.1" Further litigation may,
therefore, establish the Act as a primary vehicle for the preservation of tribal
laws and procedures. But the ever-present possibility that federal courts may
override tribal decisions when they appear too foreign stands as a constant
check on the full development of practices the Indians regard as authentically
their own.
Like jurisdiction, control of reservation resources is permeated by ambiguous legal implications and conflicting interests. Rivers that traverse reservation
lands are also used for non-Indian irrigation and power projects; fish that live
their mature lives in one part of a watercourse must have access to another
part if they are to propagate themselves; coal and oil that lie buried beneath
tribal domains become important elements of national and international
economics. Legitimate interests may exist on both sides of an issue, and often
moral arguments of equal weight come into direct conflict with one another.
Control of water resources in particular brings to the fore contending interests and policies. William Veeder forcefully argues that the waters in the
Yellowstone River Basin, which have been sought by energy companies for
use in the extraction of reservation coal deposits, belong exclusively to the
tribes whose legal rights the federal government must not fail to preserve.
Monroe Price and Gary Weatherford, in their analysis of Navajo water rights,
demonstrate that a tribe nevertheless may be forced to bargain away its asserted resource rights because of the need for short-term benefits that could
be lost in the course of lengthy and expensive litigation over their full legal
rights. Even where legislation has been passed to compensate Native Americans for land and minerals, constant pressures may exist to reduce the ostensible gain. Arthur Lazarus, Jr. and Richard West, Jr. detail the complexities of
the largest such compensation program undertaken by Congress, the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.17
The role of state governments in Indian affairs takes on special importance in disputes over taxation and regulatory controls. Reservation Indians
are required to pay federal income taxes, but state governments have tried
various tactics to subject them to state revenue laws as well. If, as Chief Justice
Marshall once said, the power to tax is the power to destroy,"8 the power to
subject tribes to state taxation may be the power to destroy absolutely. Given

16.

See Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Civil No. 75-1478 (9th Cir., Jan. 22, 1976), in 3

INDIAN L. REP. 3-10 (1976); Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir.

1974): MCnrclud v. Steele. 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Dalv v. United States, 483 F.2d 700
(8th Cir. 1973); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973); Yellow
Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438 (D.S.D. 1974). But see Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo, Civil No. 75-1615 (10th Cir., Aug. 16, 1976).
17. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-24 (Supp. Il1, 1973).
18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819).
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their poor economic status and uncertain legal rights, reservation Indians
might be hard put to maintain their societies and governments in the face of
additional tax burdens. But if taxation by the states threatens organized reservation life, tribal taxation of non-Indian businesses operating on reservation lands may, as Carole Goldberg suggests, constitute a legitimate vehicle for
developing tribal revenues. As in the case of water rights, however, the need
to balance Indian taxing efforts with more immediate economic and political
exigencies takes on as much importance as the question of the overall legality
of an Indian taxing program. Similar problems also emerge when state and
county governments attempt to apply construction, zoning, and other regulations to reservations, thereby threatening the competitive edge and governmental autonomy tribes need in order to attract capital and jobs to areas
where Indians will have an opportunity to benefit from them.
Most of American Indian law has grown out of questions relating to the
status of reservation tribes and property. But a substantial number of Indians
no longer live on reservations, and many tribal groupings have never received
federal recognition. Between 1960 and 1970 the number of Indians living in
urban areas doubled, and nearly half of all Indians now live in metropolitan
regions.19 Large numbers of Indians, including most of those who live in the
eastern United States and possess no treaties with the federal government,
remain ineligible for federal benefits. Non-reservation Indians pose two distinct legal problems: how are such concepts as "tribe" and "Indian" to be
defined for various federal purposes, and to what extent are those Indians
who live off-reservation entitled to participate in benefits primarily accorded
reservation dwellers? The former question has raised complex issues concerning the circumstances under which reservations cease to exist, the status of
plaintiffs seeking compensation before the Indian Claims Commission, the nature of federal responsibility to a non-recognized tribe, and eligibility for preferential federal hiring based on percentage of Indian blood. Non-reservation
Indians have been ruled eligible for the same welfare benefits accorded reservation residents as long as they live "near their native reservation, and .. .
maintain close economic and social ties with that reservation.' ' 20 Unresolved
are the definition of "near" and the precise rights of urban Indians. Congress
and the courts are faced with resolving the status of tribes that, for whatever
reason, never signed treaties with the federal government, yet retain some
tribal identity, and the status of individual Indians who have left their reservations to seek a livelihood elsewhere.
Indeed, the very nature of the treaties that were signed with Indian tribes

19.

U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note
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remains open to question. Courts have generally deferred to the power of
Congress on the issue of treaties, even refusing to invalidate those that were
clearly obtained by fraud or duress. 21 Some commentors, including Vine Deloria, Jr., argue that tribes should be regarded as "contractual sovereignties"
22
whose autonomy for many functions is guaranteed by their original treaties.
Others argue that revitalizing the treaty form will complicate issues more
readily handled by direct legislation. One point, however, is clear: without
greater clarification of the status of existing treaties and federal willingness to
honor the terms of prior agreements, it will be impossible to establish a climate of mutual trust in Indian-white relations.
Finally, programs designed to increase the availability and quality of Indian education raise important legal problems. As Daniel Rosenfelt indicates,
the financing of Indian schools is often tied up with federal programs that
also benefit nearby white schools. In the past, monies intended for Indian
schools have been siphoned off to support school districts with few Indian
students. More precise regulations and more carefully guarded administration
will be necessary to ensure that benefits actually reach their intended recipients.
There has been an uneven trend toward greater self-determination by Indian tribes in recent years, but the conceptual and political bases of federal
Indian policy remain clouded, confused, and contradictory. Where once
whites coveted the yellow gold of the Black Hills, now they covet the black
gold of the Yellowstone Basin. And as always, the simple imposition of statutory remedies is complicated by a unique history that brings the problems of
necessity, fairness, and legal constancy sharply to the fore. The purpose of
this symposium is to clarify the implications that might follow in the wake of
any attempt to restructure federal Indian policy, and to help establish criteria
on the basis of which Indians and whites can reach greater accord on their
common legal problems.
LAWRENCE ROSEN

21. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 294 (1902). See also Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 601 (1975),
22.
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